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A RESPONSE TO BEYOND SEPARATION: PROFESSOR COPELAND’S 
AMBITIOUS PROPOSAL FOR “INTEGRATIVE” FEDERALISM 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard* 
Professor Charlton Copeland offers a wide-ranging, ambitious cri-
tique of what he characterizes as federalism jurisprudence’s domi-
nant models of “separation” and “allocation” of authority between the 
respective federal and state spheres.1  Judicial resolution of federalism 
questions, he suggests, turns inappropriately and incompletely on the 
moment of a law’s enactment.2  This “obsession with the legislative 
process as the object of federalism enforcement”3 ignores the more 
nuanced interactive processes between federal and state authorities 
that occur after a statute is enacted and as it is implemented through 
administrative channels.  Particularly in the context of cooperative 
federal-state programs, such as Medicaid, Congress enacts the broad 
requirements with which states must comply in order to receive fed-
eral funding or avoid federal preemption.  Congress also typically 
delegates rulemaking authority to an executive branch agency to 
flesh out the details and supervise state implementation of the pro-
gram.  Necessarily, then, the federal agency will engage in ongoing 
monitoring, negotiation, and enforcement of state authorities.  It is 
this sub-congressional, continual interaction between federal and 
state authorities that Copeland finds inadequately captured in exist-
ing federalism scholarship and doctrine. 
The omission matters, Copeland suggests, because courts’ myopic 
focus on the initial exercise of congressional authority may “allow[] 
for continued interactions where substantive regulatory authority may 
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not exist.”4  In other words, a statute that was easily constitutional at 
the time of enactment might “become” unconstitutional when the 
court considers the larger life of the program over the course of time.  
Accordingly, to accurately determine whether a federal statute vio-
lates structural limits on federal power, courts must consider the con-
siderable role of administrative agencies in federalism practice and 
policymaking.  Copeland’s characterization of the ongoing federal-
state interaction in cooperative federalism programs is undoubtedly 
descriptively accurate.  But it is less clear what constitutional work 
that observation is doing, how courts deciding federalism cases would 
implement his insight, or why agency-level interactions, even between 
federal and state officials, are not otherwise adequately captured in 
administrative law doctrine. 
As far as how courts might implement Copeland’s insight, perhaps 
they would draw lines between federal and state authority in different 
places if they considered how the challenged federal program has 
been implemented.  Under the predominant separation and alloca-
tion models, Copeland suggests that a federal statute “privilege[d]” as 
constitutional at the time of enactment is thereafter forever shielded 
from federalism challenges, regardless of any post-enactment policy-
making at the agency level.5  Future interactions between federal and 
state officials “do[] not appear to impact the assessment of whether a 
statute is consistent with the Constitution’s federalism dictates.”6  But 
might those interactions nevertheless be constitutionally significant 
for separation of powers purposes relevant to administrative law? 
More fundamentally, it is not clear that Copeland’s observation 
changes the underlying question.  Accepting the premise that courts 
cannot accurately judge the constitutionality of a statute without con-
sidering the actual life of the program, rather than just the static 
moment of passage, the ultimate question is still allocation and sepa-
ration: whether federal power has crossed the line into states’ reserved 
powers.  Under Copeland’s suggestion, that inquiry would be deter-
mined not simply on the face of the statute but as actually carried out 
by a federal agency.  The analytical method and relevant “evidence” 
for resolving the question would be more nuanced.  But courts would 
still be drawing lines: separating and allocating power between the re-
spective federal and state spheres.  The suggestion that courts merely 
consider additional evidence in resolving federalism questions, while 
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not without controversy, is more modest than the one that Copeland 
wants to make. 
Copeland seems to want to say something more revolutionary, 
something that will shake up the dominant separation and allocation 
models of federalism, as a theoretical, and not just jurisprudential, 
matter.  Even accepting the descriptive accuracy of Copeland’s obser-
vations, it is not clear what the alternative model would look like.  
What would the “interactive” or “integrative” model do?  Would it 
question the hard-wired constitutional design that explicitly enumer-
ates federal power and reserves all unenumerated powers to states?  
Surely it could not.  Would it soften the inquiry, finding fewer areas 
of unconstitutional conflict and fewer federal programs challengea-
ble on federalism grounds?  Perhaps the actual course of dealings be-
tween federal and state authorities would reveal more room for exer-
cise of state power than the statutory design suggests, thereby 
rebutting the federalism challenge to the law.  Would Copeland’s al-
ternative model suggest, as the Framers did and recent commentators 
have,7 that friction and jarring between federal and state authorities is 
actually consistent with the constitutional design?  Or would the 
course of dealing reveal statutes previously considered clearly within 
congressional power as now unconstitutional?  Copeland’s concern 
about federal statutes being forever “privileged” and the Supreme 
Court’s recent Medicaid decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)8 both suggest that final possibility. 
INTEGRATIVE FEDERALISM IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
Copeland’s signal example of the dominance of the separation 
model in federalism jurisprudence is the Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision in NFIB.  In a series of “June surprises,”9 the Court struck down 
a federal conditional spending program, namely, the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) expansion of Medicaid eligi-
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bility to all low-income adults.10  To be precise, the NFIB Court did 
not actually strike any provision of the ACA but instead held that a 
long-standing provision of the 1965 Medicaid Act, authorizing the 
Secretary to withhold federal funds from noncompliant states, could 
not constitutionally be applied to states that declined to implement 
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.11  Copeland characterizes NFIB’s 
Medicaid decision as a missed opportunity to employ his integrative 
vision of federalism. 
To be sure, NFIB represents “a sharp break from past precedent.”12  
It is the Court’s first decision since the New Deal to strike down a 
federal spending power enactment and also the Court’s first applica-
tion of, as opposed to dicta reference to, the “coercion doctrine” as a 
limit on federal conditional spending power.13  Copeland struggles to 
make a case for how the NFIB decision perpetuates the separation 
and allocation dominant paradigm.  What makes his argument tough 
to swallow is that the justices, in fact, do a pretty good job of acknowl-
edging the course of dealing between federal and state officials over 
the life of the Medicaid program and infusing their reasoning with 
those observations.  Justice Ginsburg offers the most accurate, nu-
anced discussion of the program,14 but the other justices’ opinions 
have moments of insight as well. 
The highly fractured decision in NFIB produced three separate 
opinions: the Roberts plurality, holding that states could not be re-
quired to expand Medicaid but must be given the option;15 the Gins-
burg dissent, concluding that Congress was well within its spending 
power to require Medicaid expansion;16 and the unsigned joint dis-
sent, which would have held Medicaid expansion unconstitutional 
and nonseverable, and therefore the whole of the ACA unconstitu-
tional.17  For Copeland, all three opinions adhere disappointingly to 
the established allocation/separation model of federalism.18  He 
notes that each opinion does, in fact, describe and consider the on-
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CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 43 (2013) (explaining how “Justice Ginsburg’s nuanced ap-
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 15 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 16 Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 17 Id. at 2668 (joint dissent). 
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going federal-state interactions in the Medicaid program, offering a 
glimmer of hope for his alternative thesis but ultimately failing to 
embrace it.19  On closer examination, however, the opinions hew 
closer to Copeland’s ideal norm of engagement than his analysis sug-
gests. 
Copeland faults both the Roberts plurality and the Ginsburg dis-
sent for improperly focusing on a static moment of congressional ac-
tion: for Roberts, the enactment of the ACA and “new Medicaid” in 
2010; for Ginsburg, the enactment of the original Medicaid Act in 
1965.20  Both approaches ignore the ongoing federal agency involve-
ment with the states to implement fifty different state Medicaid Plans 
over almost thirty years.21  Copeland notes that State Plans are charac-
terized by wide variation among covered groups, covered services, in-
surance models, reimbursement methodologies, and coordination 
with other federal and state programs.22  Each unique State Plan is 
the product of extensive interaction and negotiation between the 
federal agency and the individual state authorities.23  Each State Plan, 
accordingly, expresses policy choices and priorities, more tailored 
and more detailed than the broad congressional design.24  The justic-
es’ analyses are incomplete for failing to reflect those integrative pro-
cesses, Copeland concludes.25 
Copeland highlights features of the Medicaid program that the 
justices’ opinions overlooked, including the history of the program 
and its current operation.26  He finds particularly telling a relatively 
recent development in the administration of the program that allows 
states considerable flexibility to waive otherwise mandatory federal 
requirements.27  Although the waiver process has become an im-
portant feature of the Medicaid program, Copeland paints a picture 
of a much more fluid, flexible program than Medicaid truly is.  Waiv-
ers do allow states to expand or modify coverage for certain groups of 
people and certain types of services.  But for the bulk of the “deserv-
ing” poor historically served by the Medicaid program,28 federal statu-
tory and regulatory requirements with which states must comply to 
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 26 Id. at 126–39. 
 27 Id. at 135–36. 
 28 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 13–17 (describing the history of 
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receive federal dollars remain fairly rigid and nonnegotiable.29  In-
deed, the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid was enacted as a mandatory 
requirement on states, not a flexible option (although the Roberts 
opinion effectively rewrote this).  In focusing on Medicaid waivers, 
Copeland overplays his hand, suggesting greater incongruity between 
his preferred approach to federalism and the justices’ reasoning in 
NFIB. 
A couple of clarifications are warranted.  First, Copeland under-
states the mandatoriness of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, suggest-
ing there is an “underlying threat”30 that the federal government 
might terminate states’ federal funding for noncompliance.  He dis-
misses that possibility as impractical and unlikely, given the enmesh-
ment of federal and state bureaucratic structures in the Medicaid 
arena.31  While it is true that the federal government has never actual-
ly withheld all of a state’s federal Medicaid dollars for noncompli-
ance,32 there is more than an “underlying threat.”  That sanction is 
expressly authorized in the original 1965 Medicaid Act.33  The fact 
that the provision reserves discretion to the federal agency whether to 
impose the ultimate sanction or to negotiate an alternative remedial 
plan with a state34 actually supports Copeland’s thesis, demonstrating 
that Congress clearly anticipated an interactive process between fed-
eral and state authorities. 
Copeland loses sight of that point with a second misstatement.  He 
asserts that the “ACA [as opposed to the original Medicaid Act] dele-
gated authority to the Secretary to withhold all federal Medicaid re-
imbursement funds for states failing to expand Medicaid eligibility.”35  
But the ACA does no such thing; it added no new penalties but mere-
ly expanded Medicaid eligibility in step with numerous prior amend-
ments over the life of the program.36  Each prior expansion,37 like the 
ACA expansion,38 has been subject to the same potential sanction of 
loss of all federal funds for states that fail to comply.  The 1965 statu-
 
 29 See id. at 17–20 (describing mandatory and optional coverage categories). 
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 33 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006). 
 34 See id; 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.15, 430.18, 430.20, 430.60 et seq. (2011) (detailing process for re-
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tory sanction figured prominently in the justices’ opinions,39 suggest-
ing, contrary to Copeland’s concern, that courts can, and, here in 
fact did, consider the ongoing interactions of federal administrative 
agencies and regulated states in evaluating federalism questions. 
For Copeland, the locus of the NFIB opinions’ failure to employ 
an integrative model of federalism is the “notice” prong.40  “Clear no-
tice” was one of the South Dakota v. Dole41 commandeering limits, 
which the NFIB Court incorporated into the coercion analysis.42  The 
notion is that cooperative federalism programs are “in the nature of a 
contract”43 and, as such, one party cannot unilaterally change the 
terms of the contract without providing notice to the other party.  To 
Copeland’s view, the notice and contract analogy perpetuates the ju-
risprudential focus on the initial enactment of a statute, rather than 
future implementation and federal-state interaction.44  For Ginsburg, 
the contract, i.e., the 1965 statute, is valid because it expressly re-
served Congress’s unilateral right to repeal, amend, and revise the 
statute45 and clearly specified funding withdrawal as a potential penal-
ty for state noncompliance with program requirements.46  For Rob-
erts, the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid represented an entirely new 
contract, which failed to provide states with clear notice of its terms, 
including the possibility of loss of all federal Medicaid funding, old 
and new.47  Copeland concludes that the justices’ “depiction of 
Spending Clause legislation as an offer to contract emphasizes the 
independence and voluntary choice of the state governments,”48 
thereby perpetuating the separation/allocation model. 
But it seems just as consistent with the analogy to consider the 
parties’ course of dealing as relevant to the contract interpretation.  
In the Medicaid context, for example, courts might consider the fed-
erally approved State Plan, and the negotiation process that occurs 
between federal agency and each respective state’s authorities in ap-
 
 39 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–05 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2629–30 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2657 (joint dissent). 
 40 Copeland, supra note 1, at 153–54. 
 41 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 42 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 51–55 (explaining the “clear no-
tice” requirement and examining its role in the NFIB opinions). 
 43 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 44 Copeland, supra note 1, at 153–54. 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006). 
 46 Copeland, supra note 1, at 159. 
 47 Id. at 162–65. 
 48 Id. at 157. 
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proving that State Plan on an annual basis,49 as the relevant contract, 
rather than the statute enacted by Congress.  Even if the Medicaid 
Act is viewed as the contract, that statute, like so many other federal 
statutes, expressly delegated implementation to a federal agency.  
That delegation, along with other terms of the statutory contract, 
clearly apprised both parties that further interactions would occur 
and binding requirements would be added over time.  Even if notice 
were the only limit animating the NFIB decision, that point is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Copeland’s integrative view of federal-
ism. 
Moreover, all three opinions consider various additional factors 
besides clear notice, with key reasoning turning on the ongoing in-
teraction between federal and state authorities.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
for example, concluded that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion crossed 
the line from pressure to compulsion because of the amount of mon-
ey that states now have at stake in the program, after nearly three 
decades of involvement.50  He noted, by contrast, that the federal 
government could offer an equally large quantum of new conditional 
funding to states without violating the coercion doctrine.51  The 
preexisting state participation and potential loss of all Medicaid fund-
ing—old and new—was what rendered the ACA expansion unconsti-
tutional.52 
As Copeland notes, the Chief Justice also highlighted the “intri-
cate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many 
decades.”53  But Copeland understands the Chief Justice’s reasoning 
to stall on the notice issue, concluding that Congress failed to provide 
adequate notice of sweeping new conditions to Medicaid, rather than 
considering the course of dealing between federal and state actors.54  
But clear notice is just one of at least three prongs of reasoning that 
animate the Roberts opinion.55  The Chief Justice’s observation about 
 
 49 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10, 430.12 (2011); Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 
17; see also Copeland, supra note 1, at 135–36 (describing the interactive process around 
Medicaid waivers). 
 50 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, 
C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 51 Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the 
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States 
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use.”). 
 52 Id. (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in 
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”). 
 53 Copeland, supra note 1, at 164 (quoting NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., 
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)). 
 54 Id. at 164–65. 
 55 See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 13, at 55–67 (also discussing the Roberts 
opinion’s use of relatedness and quantitative and qualitative coercion). 
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the decades of entanglement demonstrates why, as a practical matter, 
states can no longer opt out.  The amount of money at stake further 
leaves them with no real choice. 
According to Copeland, Justice Ginsburg also caves to the clear 
notice rationale, relying on the fact that the Medicaid statute has, 
since 1965, reserved Congress’s right to repeal, amend, or change the 
program.56  As Copeland accurately notes, Ginsburg describes in de-
tail various amendments to the program over time, some of which 
significantly increased the number and categories of individuals eli-
gible for the program.57  But he does not see her observations doing 
any real work in the Ginsburg analysis.  She notes the interaction be-
tween states and the federal government over time58 but does not in-
fuse that observation with constitutional significance.  Yet it seems 
very much to her clear notice point that Congress not only reserved 
the right to amend the program but, in fact, has used it repeatedly 
over the years with no state objection or at least no finding of consti-
tutional violation. 
That history of Medicaid expansion and amendments over the 
years also supports Justice Ginsburg’s broader point that the ACA 
does not create a “new” conditional spending program,59 as Chief Jus-
tice Roberts maintained.  Accordingly, she found it inapt to suggest 
that Congress was penalizing states that refuse to participate in a 
“new” program by withdrawing funds for an existing federal pro-
gram.60  “Congress is simply requiring States to do what States have 
long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with 
the conditions Congress prescribes for participation,”61 conditions 
which were always, in law and in fact, subject to change. 
The joint dissenters, too, consider the on-the-ground operation of 
the Medicaid program, not merely its moment of statutory enact-
ment.  In particular, they highlight states’ budgetary realities in sup-
port of the conclusion that the ACA expansion would be coercive.62  
The dissenters note that federal Medicaid funding represents one-
fifth of the average state’s budget.63  Given that reality, the possibility 
of loss of all existing Medicaid funding for states that do not agree to 
expand as required by the ACA would be coercive.64  The centrality of 
 
 56 Copeland, supra note 1, at 158. 
 57 Id. at 158–59. 
 58 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629–30 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 59 Id. at 2631. 
 60 Id. at 2635–36. 
 61 Id. at 2630. 
 62 Id. at 2662–63 (joint dissent). 
 63 Id. at 2657. 
 64 Id. 
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that fact in the dissent’s analysis reflects a clear recognition of the 
enmeshment and interdependence of federal and state authorities 
under the Medicaid program, seemingly consistent with Copeland’s 
thesis. 
That perspective is further reflected in the dissent’s practical poli-
tics “double taxation” argument.  The argument suggests that states, 
as a practical matter, cannot expect their citizens to pay federal taxes 
to support the Medicaid program, only to have their own state opt 
out of the conditional funding program and then have to exact state 
taxes to support an alternative, fully state-funded indigent health care 
program.65  Copeland notes that argument but concludes that the dis-
sent ultimately refracts it through the lens of separation and alloca-
tion, defining the respective spheres of federal and state taxing au-
thority.66  He finds the dissent’s reasoning to overlook “the ways in 
which fiscal federalism entangles the state and the national govern-
ment.”67  His argument becomes strained, however, and the path of 
less resistance would be to cite the reality of tax politics as an example 
of the justices’ acknowledgement of the interactive process of federal 
and state governance. 
Copeland’s disappointment with the NFIB opinions is that they 
are descriptively accurate of the dynamic process of federal-state co-
operation but fail to give constitutional significance to his (and their) 
observations that federalism issues are more nuanced and fact-based 
than the face of a particular federal statute reflects.  It remains un-
clear, however, just how Copeland would have the Court decide dif-
ferently.  The final part of his paper draws on administrative law as a 
promising source of a “norm of engagement.”68 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LESSONS FOR INTEGRATIVE FEDERALISM 
The federal-state interactions that Copeland identifies, even if not 
constitutionally significant for federalism, are constitutionally signifi-
cant for separation of powers, which structural limit underlies admin-
istrative law.  Federalism allocates power vertically between the feder-
al government and the states, while administrative law allocates power 
horizontally among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  
To be sure, federal statutory enactments do not stop at the steps of 
the Capitol, and courts are frequently called upon to review whether 
an executive branch agency has exceeded the scope of its congres-
 
 65 Id. at 2661–62. 
 66 Copeland, supra note 1, at 166–67. 
 67 Id. at 167. 
 68 Id. at 167. 
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sional delegation.  In addition to those separation of powers ques-
tions, there is ample literature on the role of administrative agencies 
in policymaking and their entanglement with (or capture by) the in-
dustries they regulate.69 
Federal programs that call for state participation necessarily place 
federal agencies in ongoing relationships with state officials.  
Copeland offers a federalism overlay to administrative law topics, not-
ing the role of federal agencies, through interaction and negotiation 
with states as regulated “industries,” in developing or altering con-
gressional policies.  In addition to Medicaid, Copeland offers the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, the No Child Left Behind Act, and 
the REAL ID Act, as examples of the “entanglement between state 
and national policy makers that exemplifies cooperative federalism.”70  
Those examples are descriptively compelling but do not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that federalism issues must be infused with 
administrative law principles, or explain why federalism and adminis-
trative law cannot operate in tandem to protect constitutional values. 
Copeland’s answer is that courts play a critical role in enforcing 
the administrative law “norm of engagement,” and could do the same 
in the federalism context.71  He cites the Court’s drug and pharma-
ceutical device preemption cases, including Wyeth v. Levine,72 as ex-
amples of the way that courts “can protect federalism values in the 
policy-implementation stage in ways by forcing agency engagement.”73  
In Wyeth, the Court rejected the Food and Drug Administration’s in-
dependent determination that its labeling requirements preempted 
state tort law not because federalism questions are outside the prevue 
 
 69 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1043 (1997) (suggesting that “the courts’ assertiveness during the period from 
roughly 1967 to 1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of poli-
cymaking by expert and nonpolitical elites. . . . The principal pathology emphasized dur-
ing these years was ‘capture,’ meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely sus-
ceptible to domination by the industry they were charged with regulating”); Richard B. 
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683 
(1975) (noting that “the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially 
legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected 
by agency policy”); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American 
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–60 (1996) (noting transition from expertise 
to politics as a justification for agency rulemaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, 
and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1986) (discussing agency 
capture); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
713 (1986); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 70 Copeland, supra note 1, at 150.  See also id. at 141–53 (describing the statutory schemes). 
 71 Id. at 105–06. 
 72 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 73 Copeland, supra note 1, at 106. 
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of federal agencies but because the agency failed to involve stake-
holders, including states, in the determination.74  The Court’s deci-
sion, then, pushed for a “norm of engagement” between federal and 
state authorities.75 
Another example that Copeland might have considered is Douglas 
v. Independent Living Center of Southern California,76 also from the 
Court’s last term and also raising significant federalism questions in 
the context of the Medicaid program.  In Douglas, a group of Califor-
nia Medicaid beneficiaries and providers challenged two amend-
ments to the state’s Medicaid program that reduced provider reim-
bursement.77  The plaintiffs argued that the amendments conflicted 
with a federal Medicaid requirement that states offer reasonable re-
imbursement, sufficient to uphold the Medicaid program’s “equal ac-
cess” guarantee.78  Recognizing the Court’s recent restrictions on the 
availability of § 1983 causes of action,79 the plaintiffs brought their 
claim under the federal Supremacy Clause, arguing that the Califor-
nia reimbursement rules were preempted by the federal Medicaid 
Act’s reasonable reimbursement requirement.80 
A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed, enjoining 
the State of California from implementing the new state statutory 
amendments.81  Meanwhile, California had already submitted the 
amendments to the federal administrative agency, the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), for final approval.82  During 
the pendency of the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, CMS in fact 
approved the California rate changes.83  Given the change in posture 
of the case, the Court declined to resolve the question presented: 
whether a party challenging the constitutionality of a state law could 
bring a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.84  Because the 
agency had acted, the proper question now was under the Adminis-
 
 74 Id. at 177 (explaining Wyeth). 
 75 See id. at 179–80. 
 76 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). 
 77 Id. at 1208. 
 78 Id. at 1209. 
 79 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (emphasizing that, absent exceptional cir-
cumstances, “federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement by 
§ 1983”). 
 80 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1208–09. 
 81 Id. at 1209. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 1210. 
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trative Procedure Act85: whether the federal agency acted within its 
delegated authority to approve the rates.86 
Applying Copeland’s insights, Douglas began as a separation and 
allocation question but, through the course of dealing between the 
state, the federal agency, and the judiciary, was transformed into an 
interactive administrative law case.  The shift may cause some heart-
ache for the plaintiffs, who lost the opportunity for judicial resolution 
under the de novo standard of review in exchange for administrative 
adjudication with judicial review only after exhaustion and under 
deferential arbitrary and capricious review.87  But the case does seem 
to “offer a unique perspective on federalism’s bureaucratic life”88 and 
exemplifies Copeland’s preference for an integrative, dynamic ap-
proach to federalism.  The Court’s ultimate refusal to decide the 
larger federalism question forced a re-engagement of federal and 
state authorities.  In sum, NFIB and Douglas, two seminal federalism 
decisions from last term, suggest that the Supreme Court may not be 
as far away from Copeland’s preferred norm of engagement than 
even he suggests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2006). 
 86 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1210. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Copeland, supra note 1, at 168. 
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